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Discussion After the Speeches of Richard B. Bilder and Donat
Pharand
QUESTION: Professor King: I was curious as to whether the
speakers would want to comment on to what extent the European Com-
munity affords a model for a balance between sovereign independence
or balanced sovereignty, and an identification of state values and cul-
tural values.
ANSWER: Professor Pharand: I have in my notes, as a matter of
fact, a word specifically on that. You are perfectly right. The EC could,
it seems to me, constitute a model for the world to imitate. But do not
forget that 21 states of the Council have developed over centuries, what
I call minimum common values. It was not done overnight by any
means. After all, it is only since 1991, for instance, that the EC has
established minimum common values in human rights. I nearly got into
the field of human rights preparing my paper. Imagine when I realized,
after writing quite a bit, that there was someone speaking on human
rights. And not only was there someone, but after his name I saw S.J.,
which meant, of course, that this was a Jesuit Father. Well, having
studied under the Jesuits for seven years, I said never will I speak on
that topic. I will not touch it, because those fellows are so solid, they
are just absolutely irreplaceable.
But anyway, it is only since 1991, that states have finally, by way
of additional protocols to the European Convention on Human Rights,
accepted that an individual may take his or her complaint directly to
the European Court, after of course having the petition declared receiv-
able by the Commission. Nevertheless, this shows the extent to which
the European countries have developed certain common values, and
how they are now developing a political community from the original
economic community.
They have accepted, as it were, a lesser sovereignty for a greater
prosperity. It is a good exchange, it seems to me. And this is the kind
of model, to use your phrase, to which, in spite of its limitations, we
could perhaps look. But I do not think it is for tomorrow, and for the
same reason, for the lack of those common values at a minimum.
ANSWER: Professor Bilder: The European Community is cer-
tainly a possible model. But I think the Community is particularly in-
teresting as showing that our classical or traditional model of interna-
tional law, which has regarded states as really the only significant-
actors in the international system, is simply no longer accurate. Obvi-
ously, the European Community - as well as other global and regional
international organizations such as the U.N., OAS, OAU, and CSCE
- have become principal players, separate and apart from the individ-
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ual states that comprise them, and we cannot hope to understand either
contemporary politics or contemporary international law without taking
them into account. For example, the European Community is now a
party in its own right to a variety of international agreements. This is
also the case, of course, with a number of substate actors and groups,
such as international NGO's and international corporations, which
again, despite their clear importance for the workings of the interna-
tional system, have been largely ignored by traditional international
law. We have to find some way of rethinking our conceptual structures
so as to bring these non-state actors into our analytical framework.
One of the most interesting things I learned in preparing my talk
for this conference was just how recent and historically contingent the
concepts of "sovereignty," "statehood" and "the state system" really
are. I found it liberating to realize that the national state is only one of
many possible ways in which people can politically organize their activ-
ities and interrelations and that we need not lock either our political or
legal thinking into that single model. Certainly, it is open to us to think
about different and more flexible kinds of international interrelation-
ships and legal structures and, indeed, this seems to be the direction we
are going.
QUESTION: Mr. O'Grady: I am interested in this idea. You fre-
quently hear it said that the nation state is a relatively modern concept,
and you just said something to that effect, Professor, but if you look at
the Roman Empire, the kings of Persia, the ancient emperors of China,
what is so different about their form of political organization from the
modern nation state, and the modern concept of sovereignty? Is this
idea not more or less autonomous to any one geographic district? Is
this not just inherent in the political organizations of mankind from
ancient time?
ANSWER: Professor Pharand: I am not sure at all that I am
versed enough in the early history of international law to delve into
that question, but I think you might well be right. We had the concept
of city-states, and then we went to the Roman Empire, and then we
went back, as it were, in a sense, at Westphalia, and developed
principalities and statehood. And, then, we went from there and devel-
oped the concept of sovereignty as we know it today in the western
world; because - as someone I believe has pointed out already - it is
basically a western concept, and we have considerable difficulty today,
when that concept is applied without limitation, by certain non-western
States.
But, to come to your question, I think you might well be right.
The essence of your comment is that we have not changed all that
much if we go back far enough.
ANSWER: Professor Bilder: I am not a scholar of this material,
but if I might slightly disagree from Donat here, my reading on this -
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which I say with a caveat - is that it was not that way. It is really
very interesting, from my reading, that our idea of statehood, of nation-
ality, of allegiances, of broad territorially defined allegiances, is really
very new, and really does come from Westphalia. Interestingly enough,
what I think the scholars in this point out, is that before we had the
state, we had - at least particularly in western society - a very global
sense, a very universal sense of law and of allegiances and things like
that.
For example, the Roman Empire, which for thousands of years
through the Holy Roman Empire, consisted of an international commu-
nity in which everybody was really together. They might have been in
little local units, but there was a spirit that there should be something
bigger, that there was a universal kind of law. Then, with the Papacy
in Christendom, there was again this broad sense that, yes, everybody
was doing their own thing, but that basically there was a binding, more
- of course I am talking mostly western - universal force, at least in
the west, that bound people together.
It was my understanding that things got to be such a mess in the
religious wars, the Thirty Years War, etc. . ., and with the growth of
capitalism and a whole bunch of factors coming together, that the state
structure was the only way to deal with the chaos of many, many dif-
ferent kinds of structures overlaying each other in terms of governance
and the lack of order in a time of particular trouble. In addition, a lot
of people say that the development of capitalism and other forces, eco-
nomic and technological forces could only be dealt with and harnessed
through a territorial consolidation, within what we now take for
granted as the state structure.
And this is what I meant in suggesting that the state was very
contingent, and that people did not think that way before. It is just now
that we have grown up. So, because I am not a scholar of it, all I can
say is that many of the writings seem to suggest that that is not the
way it is, that our way of thinking is very special to our own time in
our particular history, which I find very interesting.
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